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STANDARDS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
EVIDENCE UNDER THE SUPREME
COURT'S SUPERVISORY POWER
The sole justification for suppressing evidence in a criminal
prosecution is that the exclusion of trustworthy but illegally obtained evidence will deter future illegal police activity.' Although
considerable dispute rages over the feasibility of deterrence,2 there
ISee, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) ("[t]he rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved");
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 229 (1969); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406, 413 (1966). See also Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 671 (1970).
Judge Friendly has observed that
[a] defendant is allowed to prevent the reception of evidence proving his guilt not
primarily to vindicate his right of privacy, since the benefit received is wholly
disproportionate to the wrong suffered, but so that citizens generally, in the words
of the amendment, may be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures ...."
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 951
(1965). In his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971), Chief Justice Burger discussed the various theories that have been advanced to
justify the suppression sanction and concluded:
It is clear, however, that neither of these theories undergirds the decided
cases in this Court. Rather the exclusionary rule has rested on the deterrent
rationale-the hope that law enforcement officials would be deterred from unlawful searches and seizures if the illegally seized, albeit trustworthy, evidence was
suppressed often enough and the courts persistently enough deprived them of
any benefits they might have gained from their illegal conduct.
Id. at 415.
2 Professor LaFave has pointed out that three requirements are necessary in order to
deter unlawful police behavior through an exclusionary rule:
(a) that the requirements of the law on arrest, search and seizure, and in-custody
investigation be developed in some detail and in a manner sufficiently responsive
to both the practical needs of enforcement and the individual right of privacy; (b)
that these requirements be fashioned in a manner understandable by the frontline lower-echelon police officer and that they be effectively communicated to
him; and (c) that the police desire to obtain convictions be sufficiently great to
induce them to comply with these requirements.
LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part I: Current Police and
Local CourtPractices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 395-96 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
Although LaFave has explored the enormous problems involved in training the police
to respond to subtle legal rules, without damning the sanction entirely (LaFave, id.-Part
II: Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REV. 566, 593-609 (1965)), other
commentators have not been so restrained. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Court created a cause of action where federal
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is unanimous agreement that to accomplish this goal, courts must
at least propound clear and consistent standards to guide the officer in the field. 3 For if law enforcement officials cannot determine beforehand the pertinent standard of conduct, the sanction
forfeits its only defense.
When neither the federal constitution nor act of congress
mandates the remedy of suppression, a federal court must consider
several factors in deciding whether to admit tainted evidence. This
Note will discuss the proper exercise of federal supervisory power
where evidence has been obtained in violation of state law and a
federal court must rule upon a motion to suppress.
agents violate the fourth amendment, Chief Justice Burger mounted an all-out attack on
the exclusionary rule. Writing in dissent, the Chief Justice argued persuasively that the
rule is incapable of attaining its deterrent objective, and that the price of the rule--"the
release of countess guilty criminals" -- is far too great for society to pay. Id. at 416. Instead,
the Chief Justice urged Congress to take the lead and provide a remedy against the government for persons whose fourth amendment rights have been violated. Id. at 422-24.
There has also been substantial opinion in favor of the rule. For instance, in Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), Justice Murphy argued in dissent that "[i]f proof of the
efficacy of the federal rule were needed, there is testimony in abundance in the recruit
training programs and in-service courses provided the police in states which follow the
federal rule." Id. at 44. See also Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REv. 1083, 1145-64 (1959).
The empirical evidence does not resolve the issue. See United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct.
3021, 3030-32 (1976). The most comprehensive study undertaken, that of Professor Oaks
(see note 1 supra), has led Chief Justice Burger to conclude that "there is no empirical
evidence to support the claim that the rule actually deters illegal conduct of law enforcement officials." 403 U.S. at 416. Professor Amsterdam, however, has argued that the sur-.
vey indicates "nothing more than that the evidence so far gathered is a standoff, and that
the hopes of gathering better evidence in the future are very slim." Amsterdam, Perspectives
On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 475 n.593 (1974). For now, each
observer's view may well depend, as Professor Dworkin has put it, on where he puts the
burden of proof. Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudication and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of
Lauryering, 48 IND. L.J. 329, 332-33 (1973).
3 Clear and precise standards are necessary because "[i]t is ludicrous . . . to speak of
meaningful deterrence when there is no preexisting ascertainable standard of conduct."
Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v.
California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 552 (1964). Deterrence presupposes the existence of
norms that officers can readily perceive and react to; if these norms are vague, or the
product of sophisticated and intricate case-by-case interest balancing by the courts, then the
end result will be suppression without security. See LaFave, Warrantless Searchs and the
Supreme Court: Further Ventures Into the "Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. Buts. 9, 30 n.76 (1972).
Moreover, society can tolerate an exclusionary rule only "if the police are acting under a
set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination
beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement." LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson
Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 142. And as Justice Clark has emphatically stated: "It is
the duty of [the Supreme] Court to lay down those rules with such clarity and understanding that [an officer] may be able to follow them." Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610,
622 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
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At present, this area of the law is thoroughly confused; consequently, the rationale behind the exclusionary rule has disappeared. The Supreme Court must accept primary responsibility for
4
this situation. In two major decisions, United States v. Di Re (1948)
and Elkins v. United States (1960),' the Court established standards
for suppression that differ according to the meaningless distinction
between the act of arrest and that of search and seizure. This Note
will argue that a more rational scheme would distinguish between
state and federal law enforcement activity, and that by making this
distinction the goals of deterrence, federalism, and effective crime
control can best be achieved.
I
SOURCES OF THE FEDERAL COURTS' POWER TO SUPPRESS

A.

Suppression Under the Federal Constitution

Historically, the fourth amendment restricted police behavior
without excluding evidence gathered in an unreasonable search
and seizure.6 In Weeks v. United States (1914),' the Supreme Court
rejected this common-law position and ruled that evidence obtained by federal agents in violation of the fourth amendment was
inadmissible in a federal criminal prosecution. 8 Simultaneously, the
4 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
5 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
6

See, e.g., Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); Chastang v. State, 83 Ala. 29, 3
So. 304 (1887); People v. Alden, 113 Cal. 264, 45 P. 327 (1896); Gindrat v. People, 138 Ill.
103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329 (1841). Courts in
England and the United States were reluctant to suppress evidence of probative value.
Instead, common-law jurists suggested a civil penalty against officers responsible for an
unreasonable search and seizure. E.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
7 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
'Id. at 398. Prior to Weeks, the Supreme Court had utilized the fifth amendment, in
conjunction with the fourth amendment, as grounds for excluding evidence. Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Boyd involved an information filed by the United States
against 35 cases of plate glass, alleging their fraudulent importation. At trial, the United
States Attorney offered into evidence an order made by a district judge pursuant to a
federal statute (Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187), requiring Boyd to produce the invoice for the shipment of glass. Boyd produced the invoice, but objected to the
constitutionality of the order. The Supreme Court excluded the evidence, finding the statute "obnoxious to the prohibition of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, as well as
of the Fifth." 116 U.S. at 632. Noting the "intimate relation between the two amendments"
(id. at 633), the Court stated:
[W]e are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private books
and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amend-

19771

SUPERVISORY SUPPRESSION

Court ruled that the fourth amendment did not preclude federal
prosecutors from introducing evidence seized by state agents in
violation of the federal constitution. Thus, in Weeks the Court
mandated a suppression sanction of constitutional dimension and
gave birth to the "Silver Platter" doctrine. 9
In 1959, the Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado1 ' made fourth
amendment guidelines applicable to state police behavior, but left
the individual states free to experiment with modes of enforcement to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and an
unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 634-35. Courts have regarded the Boyd decision as the starting point in search and
seizure cases.
' This phrase, the "Silver Platter" doctrine, was coined in Lustig v. United States, 338
U.S. 74, 78-79 (1949), and described the practice approved by the dual holdings of Weeks.
The essence of the doctrine was the different treatment accorded evidence seized unconstitutionally by federal, as opposed to state, agents. Unconstitutional federal activity resulted in suppression. E.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Unconstitutional state activity with no
federal involvement furnished federal prosecutors with potent evidence. E.g., Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (dictum); Shelton v. United States, 169 F.2d 665
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 834 (1948); In re Milburne, 77 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935).
Difficulties arose when state officers performed searches and seizures in aid of federal
law enforcement, for this forced the federal courts to undertake time-consuming scrutiny
into the permissible quantum of federal participation in state law enforcement ventures. In
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927), where state troopers found liquor in a car
during an unlawful search and seizure, the Court held the evidence inadmissible in the
ensuing federal prosecution, since the troopers had acted "solely on behalf of the United
States." Id. at 316. Accord, United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1946). This
rationale was expanded in Sutherland v. United States, 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937), where
the court stated that conducting a search and seizure "solely on behalf of the United
States" was not the determining factor in Gambino (id. at 308); rather, a fourth amendment
violation occurred when there was "general co-operation between state and federal officers
and where the federal officers in fact adopted the prosecution which the state officers had
begun as a result of their search." Id.
In addition, the federal judiciary was faced with a reverse "Silver Platter" problem.
Although Weeks clearly imposed an exclusionary restriction on federal activity vis-a-vis federal criminal prosecutions, federal activity was not circumscribed vis-a-vis state courts.
States that rejected the exclusionary rule of Weeks as to evidence unlawfully seized by state
officials (e.g., State v. Chin Gim, 47 Nev. 431, 224 P. 798 (1924); Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 A. 679 (1927)), also rejected it as to evidence unlawfully seized by
federal officials (e.g., Terrano v. State, 59 Nev. 247, 91 P.2d 67 (1939), Commonwealth v.
Colpo, 98 Pa. Super. Ct. 460 (per curiam), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 863 (1930)). States that
applied an exclusionary rule to evidence unconstitutionally seized by state officials split as
to evidence unconstitutionally seized by federal officials. Some sported their own version of
the "Silver Platter" doctrine. E.g., State ex rel. Kuhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268 P.
501 (1928). Others did not. E.g., State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S.W. 858 (1924).
In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the Supreme Court, exercising its
supervisory power over the federal courts, overruled the "Silver Platter" doctrine. See notes
67-84 and accompanying text infra.
10338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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ment. Despite subjecting state police to the same constitutional
standards as those governing federal agents, the Court did not require state courts to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence
nor did it prohibit federal prosecutors from introducing evidence
obtained unconstitutionally by state agents.
Mapp v. Ohio," decided by the Warren Court in 1961, marked
the culmination of judicial acceptance of the exclusionary rule.
Dismayed by the lack of compliance with constitutional safeguards
and the failure of alternative sanctions, 12 the Supreme Court mandated suppression as the primary constitutional remedy in federal
3
and state courts.'
Recent Supreme Court cases, however, evidence a growing
discontent with the exclusionary rule and signal a major challenge
15
to its constitutional vitality. 14 In United States v. Calandra (1974),'
the Court rejected the argument that a witness can avoid federal
grand jury interrogation on the ground that the questions derive
from information procured in an unconstitutional search and seizure. The Court's opinion stressed that the suppression sanction is
6
a remedial deterrent, rather than a personal constitutional right.'
If this characterization prevails, states may once again be given
7
latitude to devise alternative deterrents to police misconduct.'
B.

Suppression Based on Federal Statutes

Section 605 of the Communications Act of 193418 was the
initial congressional contribution to the exclusionary rule. Prior to
the Act's passage, wiretap evidence had been admissible in federal
court under the logic of Olmstead v. United States.' 9 In Olmstead,
decided in 1928, the Court held that wiretaps were not constitutionally prohibited since a trespassory invasion and a tangible tak11367 U.S. 643 (1961).
12 See id. at 651-52.
13 Id. at 655.
14 Compare the majority opinion of Justice Brennan in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 389-98 (1971), with the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Burger, id. at 411-27.
15 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
16 Id. at 348.
"See Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law,
89 HARV. L. Rzv. 1, 3-8 (1975).
18 Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 Stat. 1104 provided that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication
to any person . .. ."

19277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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ing were essential components of any unconstitutional search and
seizure. 2" Thus, even though a wiretap might have been illegal
under state law, exclusion was not mandated in federal court since
the suppression sanction, as established in Weeks, related solely to
constitutional violations.
Regardless of original legislative intentions, 2 1 by 1939 the federal judiciary had interpreted the Communications Act to support
a multifaceted exclusionary rule, applicable to evidence obtained
from interstate2 2 and intrastate2 3 telephone communications. In
addition, the Act was interpreted to prohibit the use of evidence
obtained in investigations prompted by illegally intercepted
communications.2 4
In Benanti v. United States,2 5 decided in 1957, the Court applied
this legislative suppression sanction to state wiretap investigations.
As a result, federal prosecutors were prohibited from introducing
illegally obtained evidence, whether state or federal agents initiated
26
the surveillance.
2

" Id. at 465-66.

21 The legislative history of the Federal Communications Act of 1934 does not indicate

that Congress intended to enact an exclusionary rule. In fact, Olmstead, which might have
aroused congressional concern about the problem of electronic surveillance, was not mentioned in the discussion of the proposed Act. See 78 CONG. REC. 4138-39, 8822-37,
8842-54, 10,304-32 (1934). The accompanying reports were equally silent on the electronic
surveillance problem. See S. RE'. No. 781, 73d. Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); H.R. Rep. No.
1850, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934). See also Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem: An Analysis
and a Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 165, 172-74 (1952).
22 Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
23 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
24 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
Although the Communications Act did have a wide scope, it was not all-inclusive. The
Department of Justice, placing heavy emphasis on the conjunction "and" in § 605 (see note
18 supra), argued that the act permitted interception provided no disclosure was made
outside the department. See Brownell, The Public Security and Wire Tapping, 39 CORNELL
L.Q. 195, 197-200 (1954).
The Supreme Court, in Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957), held that
monitoring a conversation on an extension telephone, provided one party gave his consent,
was not a prohibited "interception." Moreover, state courts blunted the impact of the
Communications Act by holding it inapplicable to state initiated wiretapping. E.g., Harlem
Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946).
25 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
26 From the time Benanti was decided until the "Silver Platter" doctrine was overruled
in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (see notes 67-84 and accompanying text
infra), the following anomaly existed: evidence obtained by state agents in violation of a
federal statute was inadmissible in federal court, while evidence obtained by state agents in
violation of constitutional standards was admissible in the same federal court. As a further
permutation, in Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), the Court ruled that the Communications Act did not prohibit the introduction in state court of evidence obtained
through electronic surveillance. And even after Mapp was decided in 1961, announcing an
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Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 196827 is the latest legislative effort to control electronic surveillance. Although Title III authorizes tactical wiretapping pursuant
to judicial authorization, it also requires the suppression of illegally
obtained evidence.

28

C. Suppression Based on the Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court
From the beginning of its history, the Supreme Court has
formulated evidentiary rules to be applied in federal criminal
prosecutions.2 9 Since McNabb v. United States,30 decided in 1943,
this supervisory power has provided a third basis for a federal
exclusionary rule.
In McNabb federal agents conducted a prolonged custodial interrogation of five murder suspects in violation of a federal statute
that required arresting officers to take any person charged with a
crime or offense to the nearest judicial officer. 31 Incriminating
statements made during the interrogation were used to convict
three of the defendants of second degree murder. Although the
statute did not expressly require suppression, the McNabb Court
decided that use of the incriminating statements in federal court
32
would frustrate the policy behind the statute.
The roots of the McNabb decision can be traced back to Justice
Brandeis' classic dissent in Olmstead. 33 In that dissent, Brandeis
argued that the successful conviction of criminals could not justify
exclusionary rule premised on constitutional requirements (see notes 11-13 and accompany-

ing text supra), illegally obtained wiretap evidence continued to be admissible in state
courts. However, in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), decided prior to the passage of
Tide III, the Court finally overruled Schwartz. In view of the Communications Act's express language prohibiting divulgence, the Court held that recorded conversations, illegally
intercepted by state agents, were no longer admissible in state courts.
27 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
28 Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any
court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
29
See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943); C. WRIGHT, 2 FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 402, at 62 (1969).

30 318 U.S. 332 (1943).

3' Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § 1, 28 Stat. 416 (repealed by Act of June 25, 1948,
ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 994.
32 318 U.S. at 345.

33 277 U.S. at 471. For a comparison of the relevant language of the two opinions, see
Kamisar, supra note 2, at 1133-34 n.180.

1977]

SUPERVISORY SUPPRESSION

official lawlessness. In McNabb, Justice Frankfurter similarly refused to accept the notion that the end justifies the means. By
sanctioning a "flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress
had commanded," the courts would become "accomplices in willful
disobedience of law." 34
Anderson v. United States,35 decided the same day as McNabb,
further developed supervisory suppression. Although the case involved state, rather than federal, agents who illegally detained and
interrogated the defendants in violation of state law, the Court,
relying on the reasoning of McNabb and pointing out the close
cooperation between state and federal agents, reversed the
36
convictions.
In addition to framing a remedy for statutory violations, the
Supreme Court has utilized its supervisory power to exclude evidence obtained in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 37 and to enjoin federal agents from transmitting unconstitutionally seized evidence to state authorities or testifying
with respect to that evidence in state courts. 38 As the Court announced in Rea v. United States (1956), 3 9 federal guaranties of individual privacy are compromised if federal agents can ignore those
guaranties and "use the fruits of [their] unlawful act either in fed4
eral or state proceedings. "
Both Justice Brandeis in Olmstead and Justice Frankfurter in
McNabb premised the exclusion of evidence on the imperative of
judicial integrity. Their opinions demonstrated a greater concern
34 318 U.S. at 345.

35 318 U.S. 350 (1943).
36 The detention of the petitioners by state officers in Anderson violated a Tennessee
statute similar to the federal statute violated in McNabb: "No person can be committed to
prison for any criminal matter, until examination thereof be first had before some magistrate." Quoted in id. at 355.
Federal officers had not arrested the defendants until after they had confessed their
guilt during the illegal state detention. Although the federal officers were not formally
guilty of illegal conduct, the Court found that "[t]here was a working arrangement between
the federal officers and the sheriff of Polk County which made possible the abuses revealed by this record." Id. at 356. This investigation into the extent of federal involvement
in a state detention was similar to the Court's treatment of federal-state searches and seizures3 7vis-a-vis the fourth amendment. See note 9 supra.
E.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957). See also United States v. Hanson,
469 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1972); Navarro v. United States, 400 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1968).
38 Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
39

4

/d.

"Id. at 218. Subsequent cases, however, have confined Rea to its facts. See Cleary v.
Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963); Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961); United States v.
Navarro, 429 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1970); Comment, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
and Joint Searches, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 501 (1971).
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with preventing the debasement of the judicial process, than with
deterring police officers from violating the constitution. 4 1 Yet even
their eloquent voices cannot refute the argument that deterrence is
the only legitimate justification for suppression.4 2 Moreover, the
possession of supervisory power requires the Court to exercise it
with responsibility and discretion, and the mere invocation of majesterial phrases does not meet this standard. 43 If "[t]he criminal is
to go free because the constable has blundered, ' 44 the Court must
have reason to believe that by its decision it reduces the possibility
of the constable blundering again. Nothing less can be accepted.
II
SUPERVISORY SUPPRESSION FOR WARRANTLESS ARRESTS

The McNabb decision demonstrated the expansive scope of the
41 In McNabb, Justice Frankfurter actually stated:

We are not concerned with law enforcement practices except in so far as courts
themselves become instruments of law enforcement. We hold only that a decent
regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under the circumstances
revealed here.
318 U.S. at 347. See generally Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale
and Rescue, 47 GEo. L.J. 1 (1958). The authors assert that "[b]y formulating rules such as
that found in McNabb v. United States, the Court is not trying to punish the executive
department for illegality. It is simply avoiding contamination by plunging into the cesspool
itself." Id. at 33. Borrowing this handy metaphor, one may question whether preserving
the Court's hygiene is worth the cost to society of suppressing probative evidence of criminal guilt. If the decision in McNabb is to be commended, there must be more to it than
judicial cleanliness. Professor Kamisar has supplied a possible justification by asserting that
the foremost consideration underlying McNabb was the "desire to check resort by officers
to improper measures during pre-commitment detention and to avoid the difficulties of
proof over what occurred behind the closed doors." Kamisar, supra note 2, at 1133 n.178.
42 The conclusion that deterrence provides the true impetus for the exclusionary rule
suggests a re-examination of Anderson. Because the illegality there had been committed by
.state officers, it might be questioned whether the refusal of the federal court to admit the
tainted evidence could sufficiently shape local police behavior to justify suppression. However, the Court found that Tennessee exacted "scrupulous observance of [the] prohibition
by its law officers" (318 U.S. at 355), and that there was a "working arrangement" between
state and federal officers (id. at 356). Hence, exclusion of the illegally obtained confessions
did further the policy of deterrence.
'3Whatever may be said for the courts "preserving the judicial process from contamination" or against the government playing "an ignoble part" or about it being
the "omnipresent teacher," 1, for one, would hate to have to justify throwing out
homicide and narcotic and labor racket cases if I did not believe that such action
significantly affected police attitudes and practices.
Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "'Facts"and 'Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 171, 179 (1962) (foomotes omitted).
4 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 270
U.S. 657 (1926).
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federal suppression sanction. By extending the exclusionary rule
beyond violations of the Constitution and federal statutes, the Supreme Court recognized a supervisory suppression doctrine premised on the duty to maintain "civilized standards of procedure
and evidence." 45 The Court, however, did not provide standards to
guide the federal judiciary in implementing this bold directive. Nor
did the Court indicate the extent to which state constitutions, statutes, and decisions should influence the exercise of this federal
supervisory power. 46 In United States v. Di Re, 4 7 decided in 1948,
the Court addressed these issues and held that "in [the] absence of
an applicable federal statute the law of the state where an arrest
48
without warrant takes place determines its validity.
Di Re involved an investigation conducted jointly by federal
agents and New York State officers. After receiving a tip concerning counterfeit gasoline ration coupons, these agents and officers
arrested Di Re and two other men. A search of Di Re revealed one
hundred counterfeit gasoline coupons, which provided the basis
49
for Di Re's conviction under the Second War Powers Act of 1942.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Government contended that since the initial arrest of Di Re had been
properly based on probable cause, the ensuing search was permissible as a search incident to lawful arrest.5 0 In support of this
argument the Government urged that "the validity of an arrest
without a warrant for a federal crime is a matter of federal law to
51
be determined by a uniform rule applicable in all federal courts."
The Supreme Court, finding state law to be "an equally appropriate standard by which to test arrests without a warrant,"
rejected the call for a uniform federal standard, except in those
cases where Congress had enacted a federal rule. 52 The presence
45318 U.S. at 340.
4

In Anderson, the Court noted that the Tennessee judiciary demanded "scrupulous

observance" of the governing Tennessee statute. 318 U.S. at 355. Except for this remark,
the Court did not set forth specific guidelines to aid the lower courts in deciding whether
to suppress evidence obtained by state agents.
47322 U.S. 581 (1948).
48
Id.at 589.
49Act of Mar. 27, 1942, ch. 199, § 301, 56 Stat. 176 (repealed).
511332 U.S. at 587.
The Government also contended that the search of Di Re was justified as incident to
the search of a vehicle reasonably believed to be carrying contraband. Id. at 584. The
Court rejected this argument because it was "not convinced that a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would
otherwise be entitled." Id. at 587.
51Id. at 589.
52Id. at 590.
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of federal rules in certain specific situations, not encompassing the
situation at hand, demonstrated to the Court the absence of a
general federal law of arrest. 53 Since the arrest and search of Di Re
exceeded the lawful authority of officers under the applicable New
York statute, the evidence was suppressed and the conviction
reversed.5 4
Unfortunately, the Di Re Court failed to address the crucial
policy considerations that the case presented. Di Re presented the
question whether a federal court acting in an area of federal competence should enunciate a uniform rule governing the validity of
arrests without warrant, or whether it should adopt as the federal
standard the laws of the individual states.5 5 Three factors strongly
militated against the Court's choice of the latter alternative. 56 The
first was the very nature of the proceeding-an action brought by
the United States for the violation of its criminal law. In this area
53 Id. The existence of a federal law of arrest for specific circumstances conclusively
demonstrated the absence of an explicit general law of arrest. It does not necessarily follow, however, that Congress intended that there be no such general law. The failure of
Congress to act affirmatively in other areas has not prevented the Supreme Court from
establishing uniform federal rules where the circumstances have warranted it. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); note 56 infra.
54 Under the applicable New York law, according to the Court, "any valid arrest of Di
Re, if for a misdemeanor must be for one committed in the arresting officer's presence,
and if for a felony must be for one which the officer had reasonable grounds to believe the
suspect had committed ....
" 332 U.S. at 591. The Government argued that probable
cause existed for believing that Di Re had committed a felony at the time he was stopped.
The Court rejected the Government's position and found the arrest invalid under state
law. Id. at 591-95.
55 The prosecution of criminal offenses against the United States must rest upon a
specific congressional statute, and the law governing such actions is, of course, federal. See
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 21, at 67-68 (1970). Within this
area of federal competence, federal courts, purely as a matter of discretion, may adopt
state law as a rule of decision. See Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence and
Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. Rzv. 797 (1957).
In Di Re then, the Court was not compelled to apply the New York law; rather it chose to
incorporate the local rule as thefederal law of arrest.
56 It is important to distinguish between the "power to choose" federal law and the
"exercise of that power by a choice in favor of a single, federally-created substantive rule."
Mishkin, supra note 55, at 802. The former depends upon whether the Constitution grants
to the federal government the power to make law for the particular subject. The latter,
however, depends upon a number of policy considerations, including: (1) the need for a
uniform federal rule (see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943));
(2) the difficulty of framing such a federal rule (see Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610
(1895); Mishkin, supra note 55, at 803-04); (3) the interference of a federal rule with strong
state policy interest (see United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); WRIGHT, supra note
55, § 60, at 250-51); and (4) the effect of a federal rule upon the natural expectations of
the individuals concerned (see DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Mishkin, supra
note 55, at 822-23).
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of highly sensitive and important federal interests, state policy
should not dictate the federal rule. 5 7 By adopting varying state
rules, the Court made effective national enforcement of the federal
criminal law hinge on the stringency of each state's procedural
requirements. Moreover, in a situation in which only federal agents
have acted, the Di Re rule frustrates federal policy without advancing state interests.- 8
A second factor which the Court failed to consider was the
federal judiciary's strong interest in formulating and administering
uniform rules to govern the admissibility of evidence in federal
criminal proceedings. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 2659 was
specifically designed to promote "the development of uniform rules
of criminal evidence for the federal courts,' 60 in order to ensure
61
similar decisions from similar facts in the different district courts.
57Because the federal interests in favor of a uniform rule of arrest are almost overwhelming, at least where federal officials are involved, the Court should have followed the
reasoning of Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), and established a
federal standard. At the very least it should not have adopted state law without a reasoned
explanation for its decision.
'8 See. e.g., United States v. Perez, 242 F.2d 867, 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
941 (1957); Janney v. United States, 206 F.2d 601, 604 (4th Cir. 1953); Coplon v. United
States, 191 F.2d 749, 753 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
Of course, where a federal court is faced with evidence illegally obtained by state
agents, different considerations arise. Where state courts exclude such evidence, the refusal
of a federal court to suppress unduly frustrates the strong state interest in deterring unlawful police behavior. With a federal outlet for such evidence, state officers need only
drop their illegal baggage at the federal prosecutor's office, rather than at the state's. Although a federal court should not bind federal agents to state standards, this does not
imply that state agents should be free to disregard the law they have sworn to uphold.
Indeed notions of federalism press for the opposite result. See notes 79-84 and accompanying text infra.
'9 At the time the Court decided Di Re, Rule 26 stated:
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
unless otherwise provided by an act of Congress or by these rules. The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of witnesses shall be governed,
except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States
in the light of reason and experience.

18 U.S.C. app. § 4502 (1970).
Concurrent with the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress
amended Rule 26 and renamed it "Taking of Testimony": "In all trials the testimony of
witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by an Act of Congress or by these rules, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the
Supreme Court."
60 8A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE

26.02 (2d ed. 1975).

61The original Advisory Committee note 2 to Rule 26 stated:
This rule differs from the corresponding rule for civil cases (Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a) ... ), in that this rule contemplates a uniform body of
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Since the Di Re rule undermines this policy, 62 there is a strong
63
argument that the court simply erred.
The most serious defect in the Di Re decision, however, was
that the Court excluded probative evidence without asking whether
suppression would deter official misconduct. Had the Court focused on this issue, it surely would have realized that its decision
did not meet the most basic requirement for the sanction-that the
standard be as clear and consistent as possible. 64 The deterrence of
unlawful police conduct presupposes the existence of an understandable rule. Di Re, however, subjects a federal agent who works
in more than one state to a different code of behavior within each,
thereby imposing upon him an unreasonable and unattainable obligation to learn and observe the law of each. 65 This result obviously frustrates the policy behind the exclusionary rule. In short,
the Court in Di Re had an ideal opportunity to establish a clear and
uniform standard to govern federal arrests. Instead, it opted for a
rule that, by incorporating state standards, results in greater confu66
sion and inefficiency.
rules of evidence to govern in criminal trials in the Federal courts, while the rule
for civil cases prescribes partial conformity to State law and, therefore, results in a
divergence as between various districts. Since in civil actions in which Federal
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the State substantive law governs
the rights of the parties, uniformity of rules of evidence among different districts
does not appear necessary. On the other hand, since all Federal crimes are statutory and all criminal prosecutions in the Federal courts are based on acts of Congress, uniform rules of evidence appear desirable if not essential in criminal cases,
as otherwise the same facts under differing rules of evidence may lead to a conviction in one district and to an acquittal in another.
18 U.S.C. app. § 4502 (1970).
62 After Di Re the lawfulness of an arrest by federal officers, and thus of a search
incident to the arrest, has been governed by different rules according to the particular
state within which the action took place. Equivalent evidence may be admissible in the
federal courts of one jurisdiction, while inadmissible in another. Consequently, convictions
or acquittals
based upon identical facts may vary from state to state.
63
See Eichner, The "Silver Platter"-NoLonger Usedfor Serving Evidence in Federal Courts,
13 FLA. L. REV. 311, 325 (1960). But see Parsons, State-Federal Crossfire in Search and Seizure
and Self Incrimination, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 346, 348-49 (1957).
64 See notes 2-3 supra.
65 A basic premise behind the exclusionary rule is that police will heed the legal standards governing their behavior, and that this adherence will result in acceptable law enforcement activity. See notes 1-2 supra. Given this basic assumption, a court is not justified
in unnecessarily increasing the difficulty of police compliance. Subjecting federal officers to
a different rule for each jurisdiction in which they operate stretches an initially doubtful
proposition to the point of sheer absurdity. That an officer act in accordance with one
clear standard when he contemplates the arrest of a suspected criminal is all that we
should demand of him. See note 3 supra.
66In United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
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III
SUPERVISORY SUPPRESSION FOR
SEARCH AND SEIZURE

In Elkins v. United States,67 decided in 1960, the Supreme Court
rejected the "Silver Platter" doctrine 6 8 and held that federal courts
must suppress evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional search by state police. Focusing on the logic of its prior
decision in Wolf,69 the Court reasoned that since the foundation of
the "Silver Platter" doctrine-that unreasonable state searches did
not violate the federal constitution-had disappeared in 1949,70
the "Silver Platter" doctrine was no longer justifiable.7 Under the
holding of Di Re that the law of the state where a warrantless arrest occurred determines
its validity. Id. at 420-21 n.8.
Nevertheless, Di Re does not control the entire field of warrantless arrests. Congressional enactments establish standards in a number of specific situations: 18 U.S.C. § 3052
(1970) (FBI Agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3053 (1970) (United States Marshals); 18 U.S.C. § 3056(a)
(Supp. V 1975) (Secret Service Agents); 18 U.S.C. § 3061 (1970) (Postal Officers); 21
U.S.C. § 878 (1970) (Agents of Drug Enforcement Administration); 26 U.S.C. § 7607
(1970) (Customs Service Agents).
67 364 U.S. 206 (1960). The exact issue in Elkins was whether articles obtained as the
result of an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, without any federal involvement,
could be introduced in a federal court over a defendant's timely objection.
68
See note 9 supra.
69 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In Wolf the Court held that although the fourteenth amendment prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers, it did not forbid the
admission of such unconstitutionally seized evidence in state courts. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
M"364 U.S. at 213.
71 In Elkins, Justice Stewart maintained that the Supreme Court had demonstrated an
"awareness that the constitutional doctrine of Wolf [had] operated to undermine the logical
foundation of the Weeks admissibility rule... from the very day that Wolf was decided." Id.
at 214. As proof of this awareness, Justice Stewart pointed to the case of Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), decided the same day as Wolf. In Lustig the Court had to decide
whether an illegal search had been "federal," with the evidence barred by Weeks, or "state,"
with the evidence admissible under the "Silver Platter" doctrine. The Court concluded that
"[w]here there is participation on the part of federal officers it is not necessary to consider
what would be the result if the search had been conducted entirely by state officers." 338
U.S. at 79. On this basis Justice Stewart argued that doctrinal support for the "Silver Platter" doctrine had been eroded. 364 U.S. at 214.
Justice Stewart's reliance on Lustig was misplaced. The Lustig Court did not reject the
"Silver Platter" doctrine. Instead, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine's vitality by scrutinizing the facts of the case in order to determine whether the search had been "federal" or
"state." 338 U.S. at 75-78. Finding federal participation, the Court suppressed the evidence
under Weeks. Id. at 79. If the "Silver Platter" doctrine had been tarnished, the Court
would have focused on the nature of the search, rather than on its participants. Regardless
of the "awareness" of the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts continued to admit
evidence illegally seized by state officers without even mentioning the impact of Wolf. See
364 U.S. at 213-14.
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rubric of the Court's supervisory power over the administration of
justice in the federal courts, 72 Justice Stewart announced that
henceforth the admissibility of evidence seized by state officers
would be governed by a federal constitutional standard.7 3
While the demise of the "Silver Platter" doctrine was long
overdue,7 4 the Courts promulgation of an identical rule for both
federal and state activity created problems of its own.7 5 Justice
Frankfurter recognized this in a brilliant dissent, in which he
364 U.S. at 216.
Court stated:
[W]e hold that evidence obtained by state officers during a search which, if conducted by federal officers, would have violated the defendant's immunity from
unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible
over the defendant's timely objection in a federal criminal trial. In determining
whether there has been an unreasonable search and seizure by state officers, a
federal court must make an independent inquiry, whether or not there has been
such an inquiry by a state court, and irrespective of how any such inquiry may
have turned out. The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state
court may have countenanced, nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.
Id. at 223-24 (footnote omitted).
14 The Court rested its decision upon principles of both logic and policy. Regarding the
former, Justice Stewart stated that "no distinction can logically be drawn between evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that obtained in violation of the Fourteenth," for "[t]he Constitution is flouted equally in either case. To the victim it matters not
whether his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer." Id.
at 215. The stronger view, however, is that the suppression of evidence does not rest upon
the constitutional right of the individual, but upon the general right of the populace to be
free from future fourth amendment violations. See note 1 supra. Nevertheless, the policy
arguments advanced by the Court were far more telling: namely, that the willingness of
federal courts to admit evidence unconstitutionally obtained by state police unduly frustrated state efforts to deter official misconduct and seriously impeded free and open cooperation between federal and state officers. 364 U.S. at 221-22. Predictably enough, the Court
could not resist invoking the fabled "imperative of judicial integrity" as additional support
for its decision. Id. at 222-23.
7' There is, however, an extremely subtle argument that Elkins really provides for the
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of state law. If, as the Court maintained, Elkins
was an exercise of the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice
in the federal courts (see 364 U.S. at 216), then by definition the Court was not faced with
constitutionally compelled suppression. If the suppression of evidence obtained by state
officers in a search and seizure violative of the federal constitution was constitutionally
mandated-as the case of Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cited with
approval in Elkins, 364 U.S. at 214, held it was-then the Elkins Court must have been
concerned with illegally seized, as opposed to unconstitutionally seized, evidence. If not, the
Court's invocation of its supervisory power was superfluous.
The danger with such an analysis is that it may read far more into Justice Stewart's
choice of words ("[w]hat is h'ere invoked is the Court's supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts") and into the citation of the Hanna case than
was intended. In any event, Justice Frankfurter's criticism of the new standard on the very
ground that it would not suppress evidence obtained by illegal but not unconstitutional
means (see note 79-84 and accompanying text infra) settles the issue.
72

73 The
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pointed out three serious difficulties with a uniform standard.
First, Frankfurter argued, the holding in Elkins introduced a
"troublesome and uncertain new criterion, namely, the 'unconstitutionality' of police conduct, as distinguished from its mere illegality
under state or federal law."'7 6 Second, the "new rule potentially
frustrate[d] and create[d] undesirable conflict with valid and
praiseworthy state policies which attempt to protect individuals
from unlawful police conduct. '7 7 And third, Frankfurter warned
of the conflicts certain to arise between federal and state courts if
the former could "hold state officers blameless after a state court
ha[d] condemned their conduct, or... hold them to have been at
fault after the State ha[d] absolved them. '7 8 The latter two objections, based upon notions of comity and federalism, strike at the
heart of Elkins' shortcomings.
The thrust of Frankfurter's dissent was that by allowing federal courts to admit the spoils of illegal state searches and seizures,
the Court unjustifiably frustrated the valid state policy of deterring
unlawful police behavior. 7 9 In those states that would suppress
76364 U.S. at 243. Frankfurter's concern, and it is a valid one, was with the problems
introduced by transforming each exercise of supervisory power into a constitutional adjudication based upon the "wholly hypothetical question" whether the state search, if conducted
by federal officers, would have violated the fourth amendment. Id. at 243-44. Irrelevant to
the operation of the Court's new rule were violations of state law, or "hypothetical violations
of federal statutes, had the search been 'conducted by federal officers.' "Id. at 244. Instead,
the Elkins opinion invited repeated contravention of the settled rule that the Court refrain
from deciding constitutional issues if alternative dispositive grounds are available. See the
famous concurring opinion of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936).
77364 U.S. at 245.
78
d. at 248.
79"State law seeking to control improper methods of law enforcement is frustrated by
the Court's new rule whenever a State which enforces an exclusionary rule places restrictions
upon the conduct of its officers not directly required by the Fourth Amendment with regard
to federal officers." Id. at 245.
Justice Frankfurter posed a splendid illustration of the potential problems with the new
rule. Consider, he hypothesized, a case where blood is taken from a suspect without his
consent and then admitted into evidence against him. Although such a practice would not
violate the Constitution (Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)), a state may decide that
this practice is so reprehensible that the blood-test evidence must be suppressed in state
prosecutions in order to discourage such police activity (e.g., Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich.
427, 93 N.W.2d 281 (1958)). Under Elkins, a federal court would not be similarly precluded
from utilizing the results of such a test because the police conduct, while illegal, is not
unconstitutional. Analogous problems would arise if federal and state positions on search
differed significantly. 364 U.S. at 246-47.
Indeed, as Frankfurter noted, the two cases before the Court, Elkins and Rios v.
United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), both involved a prior state determination that the
relevant police conduct was illegal under state law. Yet the Court remanded the cases for an
independent determination of the constitutionality of the same actions. 364 U.S. at 247.
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such evidence in their own courts, the Elkins rule gave a new and
powerful incentive to state officers to disregard local law and simply turn over their evidence to federal prosecutors who remained
free to utilize it.8 0 Moreover, in those states that would admit unconstitutionally seized evidence, the Court's rule could not possibly
influence police conduct.8 ' Frankfurter's solution was that the federal courts should exclude only that evidence seized by state officers that the state judiciary would likewise exclude. 82 The result
would be a federal standard far more responsive to valid state
interests and much more likely to minimize conflict between state
and federal courts within a single jurisdiction.8 3 Since in Elkins
8o 364 U.S. at 245-46. This result is not unlikely. Because a considerable amount of
criminal activity is punishable under both state and federal statutes (see Parsons, supra note
63, at 348-49), it takes little imagination to conceive a situation in which state police illegally obtain evidence while preventing a local crime and then simply turn the evidence over
to their federal counterparts for a federal criminal prosecution based on the same facts.
Since the majority opinion stressed that "[tihe very essence of a healthy federalism depends
upon the avoidance of needless conflict between state and federal courts" (364 U.S. at 221),
it is anomalous that the strong possibility of federal interference with state attempts to deter
unlawful police behavior should have gone unheeded. See id. at 248-49.
81 364 U.S. at 248.

Because Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), applying the federal suppression sanction
to the states, had not yet been decided, state courts remained free to admit unconstitutionally seized evidence in their own courts. See notes 11-13 and accompanying text supra.
Nevertheless, at the time Elkins was decided more than half of the states did not permit the
introduction of such evidence. See 364 U.S. at 219, 224-25. In the other states, meanwhile,
federal suppression could not possibly deter unconstitutional behavior by state officers
when those officers' own courts willingly admitted such evidence. Frankfurter aptly summarized the anomalous result of the Elkins opinion:
With regard to evidence from States which have not adopted exclusionary rules,
the Court's innovation of today deprives the federal courts of relevant evidence
through hazardous constitutional determinations without any significant or legitimate compensating effect upon state or federal law enforcement. In States which
do apply an exclusionary rule, the Court's new formulation accords no respect to
valid state policies and is a source of conflict with state courts.
Id. at 248-49.
82 364 U.S. at 249. Similarly, Frankfurter would accept in federal court that evidence
which the state courts would accept. Id. However, no other Justice adopted Frankfurter's
proposal. In a memorandum written by Justice Harlan and concurred in by Justices Clark
and Whittaker, the three other dissenters supported Frankfurter's criticism of the rule
forged by the majority, but observed that "the arguments which he [Frankfurter] has so
convincingly set forth likewise serve to block the more limited inroads which he would
make on the so-called 'silver platter' doctrine." Id. at 251-52.
83 Because Frankfurter's suggestion would allow different results on the same set of
facts in federal prosecutions in different states (see The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARV.
L. REv. 95, 151 (1960)), it would run afoul of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 in
the same way that the Di Re rule did. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra. There
is a crucial distinction between the two, however, for Frankfurter did not argue that a state
standard should apply to federal officials, as Di Re held, but only that it should apply to
state officers acting under state authority.
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itself a state court had excluded the evidence on the basis of state
statutory violations, Frankfurter argued that the federal courts
should have accorded respect to state policy by similarly suppress84
ing the evidence.
United States v. Scolnick,8 5 decided in 1968, illustrates precisely
the problem that Frankfurter's dissent recognized. In Scolnick the
Government conceded that the local police had not complied with
a state statute prescribing the manner in which safe-deposit boxes
could be searched. Nevertheless, the Government argued that this
violation was insignificant, since the test for admissibility was
purely one of federal law. 86 After discussing both the majority
opinion and the principal dissent in Elkins,8 7 the Third Circuit
concluded that "[t]hese Supreme Court cases show that the fact
that evidence is illegally obtained exclusively by state officers does
not automatically preclude its use in federal criminal trials."8 8 Instead, a federal court must make its own independent determination as to the validity of the search under the federal constitutional
requirement of "probable cause. '8 9 Since the warrant in Scolnick
met federal standards, and since the Pennsylvania statute imposed
only an additional procedural requirement, the court held the

84 364 U.S. at 247.

85 392 F.2d 320 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 931 (1968). Pursuant to a valid warrant,
Philadelphia police officers arrested Scolnick on a charge of burglarizing jewelry. As a
result of a search made incident to the arrest, a safe-deposit box key was found. The
legality of these actions was not challenged. The police then sought a warrant to search the
box in which the jewelry was believed to be hidden. A state magistrate issued the warrant
despite a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited the issuance of a warrant to search a safedeposit box until at least 48 hours after notice and a copy of the petition had been served
upon the holder of the box. The purpose of this requirement was to give the holder an
opportunity to appear in court to show cause why the box should not be opened. See 392
F.2d at 324.
The ensuing search revealed $100,000 in cash, but no jewelry. The state officers immediately notified the Internal Revenue Service of the $100,000. The Service then levied
upon and sealed the box after first serving Scolnick with a notice of termination of tax
year as well as a demand for unpaid taxes. To prevent the Service from removing the
contents of the box, Scolnick secured a temporary injunction in federal district court prohibiting the bank from turning over the box or its contents. He then unlawfully removed
the box from the bank and consequently was charged with federal crimes. 392 F.2d at
322-24.
86 392 F.2d at 325.
"' Id. at 325. The court also pointed out that the Elkins rule had been applied in Rios
v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960), and "has been quoted with apparent approval by a
unanimous Court in Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)." 392 F.2d at 325 (parallel citations omitted).
88 392 F.2d at 325.

89Id. at 325-26.
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search valid and the evidence admissible. 9 0
The Scolnick dissent argued that there was no reason for a
federal court to disregard a state policy protecting the privacy of its
citizens' safe-deposit boxes. Accordingly, the court's decision encouraged state officers to violate the very laws that controlled their
conduct; it promoted the view that the end justifies the means. 9 1
Invoking Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead, the dissent concluded that the evidence from the illegal search should have been
92
suppressed.
IV
Di Re AND Elkins TOGETHER
The Court decided Di Re in 1948 and Elkins in 1960. On a
superficial level the cases are not inconsistent. The former held
that state law is to govern arrests; the latter that federal law is to
90

Id. at 326. The court also indicated that had federal agents been involved, they

certainly would not have been bound by the state statute since the 48-hour notice requirement was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c), which requires the
officer to whom a warrant is issued to make the search "forthwith." Id. at 326 n.4.
91 Id. at 328.
92Id. A Case Note in 82 HARV. L. REv. 1563 (1969) agreed with the dissent's argument
and concluded that "since at least some relation, however debatable, with fourth amendment rights can be adduced, the Scolnick court ought, in the interest of healthy federalism,
to have given full weight to state interests and to have excluded the illegally obtained
evidence." Id. at 1568. The Note, in effect, proposed an interest-balancing test whereby the
'effect federal courts would give to a state statute would depend upon the relationship of
the statute to fourth amendment rights. For example, if the police illegality did not infringe upon the defendant's fourth amendment rights, exclusion of the evidence would not
be necessary. In contrast, violation of a statute directly protecting fourth amendment
rights, such as a state law imposing strict controls on wiretapping and eavesdropping,
would result in exclusion of the evidence. Id. at 1566.
The Note correctly placed the Scolnick statute between those two extremes, since the
statute, although dealing with the issuance of a search warrant, may have required the
48-hour delay merely as a procedural matter of convenience, unrelated to the protection of
substantive rights. Nevertheless, the Note concluded that because "[c]ontrol of local police
and the general responsibility for law enforcement are usually considered to embody
[substantial state] interests" (id. at 1568), and because "[flederal courts defer in general to
state rules of decision where a substantial state interest is perceived" (id. at 1567), the
Scolnick court should have recognized the Pennsylvania statute and suppressed the evidence
obtained in violation thereof. The Note did concede that federal courts should ignore the
illegality of a search where state courts themselves would not suppress, since a federal
court should not be compelled to accord greater deference to a state statute than does the
state itself. Id. at 1568.
The Note's proposal that courts engage in a balancing process in every case to determine whether the state rule is integrally related to fourth amendment protection is theoretically a very satisfying one. Unfortunately, in the context of the fourth amendment,
decision-making through an ad hoc balancing technique is patently out of place. See note 3
supra.
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govern searches and seizures. Closer analysis, however, reveals that
the two cases demonstrate irreconcilable views of the proper scope
of federal law enforcement activity and of the meaning of
federalism itself.
For the purpose of deciding which sovereign's law shall control, the distinction between police conduct as "arrest" and police
conduct as "search and seizure" is meaningless. 9 3 The labels embody no policy content; they are descriptive rather than evaluative
terms. 94 To make the choice of law depend upon this arbitrary
classification ignores the existence of competing federal and state
interests and may result in the mechanical and unwarranted suppression of probative evidence. In addition, it is highly unlikely
that a court can make an accurate after-the-fact evaluation whether
there was sufficient probable cause for an arrest, thus permitting
the officer to conduct a search incident to arrest, as opposed to a
search and seizure proper.95 To compel courts to draw these distinctions in individual cases wastes an extraordinary amount of
judicial time. Real life behavior, especially police behavior, does
not fit so easily into neat legal pigeonholes. Nor, in this context,
is there any reason for courts to be concerned with such a classification.
Once the false distinction between arrest and search breaks
down, the inconsistency between Di Re and Elkins becomes evident.
If federal law determines the legality of a search made by state
officers, then a fortiori it would seem that federal law should also
control the legality of an arrest made by federal officers. If state
officials are to be judged by federal standards in an Elkins situation,
93 To meet the requirements of probable cause for arrest, an officer must demonstrate
that he possessed probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that the
person he sought to arrest had committed that crime. Probable cause to obtain a search
warrant necessitates a finding of probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the evidence sought is located within the area to be searched. See Comment,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHi. L. REV.
664, 687 (1961).
"4In the context of varying state and federal standards these terms are merely descriptive. In a single jurisdiction, however, valid policy reasons may call for differences between
arrest and search and seizure in terms of the requirements for probable cause or the kind
of police procedure to be followed. Nevertheless, in a cross-jurisdictional context (federal
versus state) the choice of the applicable standard should be governed by the jurisdictions'
interests in having their own law applied, and not by an examination of the content of the
laws themselves. Thus, the particular state interest that might prompt adoption of a stringent standard for night-time arrests is irrelevant. The true issue is whether, considering
the justification for the exclusionary rule and notions of federalism, state or federal law
should govern.
95 See LaFave, "Case-by-CaseAdjudication," supra note 3, at 138-40.
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then it is illogical for federal officials to be bound by state standards in a Di Re situation. Changing the perspective, there appears
no legitimate reason why a federal court should defer to state
policy when federal agents arrest without a warrant, yet ignore that
policy when the state's own agents conduct a search in violation of
local law.
The confusion that Di Re and Elkins together engender stems
from the Court's mandating separate tests based on a distinction
between the kind of law enforcement activity involved-arrest or
search-instead of establishing a test founded upon the suppression sanction's true rationale and a proper respect for federal-state
relations. With regard to these latter considerations, the holding in
Di Re was clearly deficient, for its deference to state law unduly
frustrates the federal policies of crime prevention, 96 uniformity of
result, 97 and deterrence of unlawful police conduct.9 8 Similarly, the
rule set forth in Elkins excessively expands the scope of federal law
at the expense of valid state interests. 99 In order to arrive at a
proper balance, there must be a synthesis of the two cases, and
courts must develop a new standard based upon the jurisdictional
affiliation-state or federal-of the officer or officers involved.
This standard would represent the optimal accommodation of
competing state and federal interests, while furthering the policy
behind the exclusionary rule. When federal officers conduct the
arrest or search and seizure, a uniform federal rule should clearly
govern their actions. 1 " When state officers act, the balance is an
extremely close one, but the conclusion here is that the state rule
should apply.1 ' Nevertheless, it is only by making this factual dis9' See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
9' See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
98 See notes 64-65 and accompanying text supra.
notes 79-84 and accompanying text supra.
"" On the federal side of the balance are the previously mentioned factors of crime
prevention, uniformity of result, and increased deterrence through the existence of a clear,
uniform standard for all federal officers. On the state side is the state interest in protecting
its citizens from certain kinds of law enforcement activity that, although constitutional, may
represent a greater invasion of individual privacy than the state deems tolerable. When the
respective interests are weighed, the federal rule comes out far ahead. Although a state
may wish to protect its citizens from particular police behavior, these restrictions are
legitimate only when applied to local officers and nonfederal crimes. Within the sphere of
federal police and offenses, federal policies and the rationale behind the suppression sanction press for a federal standard.
"I Supporting a federal rule are the federal interests in uniformity of result and prevention of crime. The federal interest in deterrence is minimal, however, since only state
officers are involved. In fact, the goal of deterrence shifts the balance to the other side, for
if federal courts admit evidence seized by state officers in violation of state law, those
"See
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tinction between state and federal activity, rather than between
arrest and search, that courts can finally begin to formulate realistic and responsive legal rules in this significant0 2 and heretofore
chaotic area of the law.
The following categories present four common factual situations that arise in federal criminal proceedings. Each section sets
forth (1) current law under Di Re and Elkins, and (2) what the
law, according to the normative principles previously discussed,
should be.
A.

Search and Seizure of Evidence by Federal Officers

This category is the most settled of the four. Both case law and
the normative resolution coincide. Elkins directs that a federal
standard shall govern the admissibility of evidence seized by federal officers; considerations of federalism and the rationale of the
suppression sanction compel the same result. Thus, when federal
agents obtained evidence in violation of an Illinois law prohibiting
the taping of conversations without consent or judicial authorization, the court in United States v. Infelice113 correctly admitted -the
evidence and held that "[flederal law governing the admissibility of
evidence in federal criminal trials permits the introduction of such
tape recordings.'

B.

1

4

Other cases are in accord."

5

Search and Seizure of Evidence by State Officers

Here case law compels application of a federal constitutional
standard, while the normative principles dictate application of a
state standard. The courts uniformly adhere to the interpretation
officers will then have a genuine incentive to act unlawfully. See note 80 supra. Moreover, a
healthy respect for federalism-that the federal sovereign will defer to a state's attempt to
limit the power of its own police-militates towards a state, rather than a federal, rule.
102 Because searches incident to arrest are far more prevalent than warranted searches
(see LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication," supra note 3, at 143), the Di Re rule may often
frustrate valid federal law enforcement policies where there is no applicable federal statute
giving federal agents power to arrest without a warrant. See note 66 supra. Thus, in a
state like California, which refuses to allow the kind of automobile search sanctioned as
constitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), the
admissibility of evidence in federal court will depend upon whether the activity is characterized as an arrest and search incident to arrest (Di Re controlling), or as a search and
subsequent arrest based upon the results of that search (Elkins controlling).
103 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975).
104Id. at 1365.
15

E.g., United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
929 (1975); United States v. Green, 446 F.2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Vespe,
389 F. Supp. 1359, 1372 (D. Del.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Shaffer, 520 F.2d 1369
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
"
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of Elkins set forth in Scolnick-that evidence seized by state officers
in violation of state law is admissible in federal court if consistent
with constitutional standards. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed
this principle. 11 6 Indeed, most courts mechanically apply the rule
without even discussing the important issues involved. 107 The district court in United States v. King,' 8 however, recognized the policy
question at stake and spoke directly to it:
It appears to this Court that the more pertinent question
raised here, irrespective of Elkins, might have been whether, as a

matter of respect for state law and policy, a federal court would
refuse to accept into evidence the products of a seizure which, if
conducted exclusively by federal officers, would have been perfectly proper, but was in fact assisted in by state officers who
were thus violating their own state statute. 0 9
Instead of deciding this question, however, the court retreated
and found that under the facts it could avoid the issue. 11 0
The result is that case law squarely accords with the interpretation of Elkins that a federal constitutional standard is to govern the
admissibility of evidence seized by state officers.1 ' The normative
10,6 Preston
1 7

v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 366 (1964).
" E.g., United States v. Rael, 467 F.2d 333, 335 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
956 (1973); United States v. Hopps, 331 F.2d 332, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 820
(1964); United States v. Sorenson, 330 F.2d 1018, 1020 n.1 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 945 (1965); Smith v. United States, 321 F.2d 427, 429 (9th Cir. 1963).
10s 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971), modified, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 920 (1974). In King, federal agents set up a duly authorized wiretap under
Title III, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970). The defendants, however, moved to suppress on the
basis of a San Diego County Deputy Sheriff's participation in the wiretap. Since California
law prohibited such wiretapping without consent, the defendant contended that the state
officer's involvement violated state law and, under Elkins, precluded the United States from
utilizing the intercepted communication. The court correctly held that Elkins meant to exclude from federal court only evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution, and thus
the evidence here, although in violation of state law, was nevertheless admissible. 335 F.
Supp. at 546-47.
109 335 F. Supp. at 547.
'°Id. Apparently the court decided the case on two independent grounds: First, it
refused to decide whether the state officer's participation in the tap necessitated suppression on the ground that the officer was present at the surveillance site on only one occasion
and that "[ilt was never revealed whether his presence on that occasion was necessary or
even helpful to the progress of the tap." Id. The supremacy clause furnished the second
ground for the decision. The court explained that Di Re applied only to the limited situation in which there were both an arrest without warrant and no federal statute on the
subject. Id. at 547-48.
In fact, one case has even implied that a state officer may have greater leeway
under the Constitution "to search and seize" than a federal officer would under the same
circumstances. Frye v. United States, 315 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 849
(1963).
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resolution that federal courts should defer to state policy considerations whenever federal policy is unexpressed, finds little support
in the case law. Rather, the courts have mechanically followed
Elkins.

1 12

112 See cases cited in note 107 supra.

In a recent case, the Supreme Court ruled that evidence unconstitutionally obtained by
a state criminal law enforcement officer is admissible in civil proceedings by or against the
United States. United States v. Janis, 96 S. Ct. 3021 (1976). InJanis, a state court issued a
search warrant pursuant to which local police seized $4,940 in cash and wagering records.
The police then advised the Internal Revenue Service that Janis had been arrested for
bookmaking activity. Using a calculation based upon the seized evidence, the Service
assessed Janis for wagering excise taxes and levied upon the $4,940 in partial satisfaction.
In the subsequent state criminal proceeding against Janis, the trial court held the police
affidavit defective, quashed the warrant, and ordered that, with the exception of the
$4,940, all items be returned to the defendant. Janis then filed a refund claim for the
money and eventually brought an action in federal court. The district court and the court
of appeals concluded that Janis was entitled to the $4,940 because the assessment had been
based upon unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
The Supreme Court first reaffirmed the principle that "the 'prime purpose of the
[exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, 'is to deter future unlawful police conduct'" (id. at
3028 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974))), although Justice
Blackmun observed that the empirical evidence supporting the deterrence argument remained inconclusive. Id. at 3030-31 & n.22. See note 2 supra. Since in the present instance a
state officer was the "primary object of the sanction" (96 S. Ct at 3029), the Court considered the extent to which exclusion of the evidence in a federal civil proceeding would
result in increased deterrence of unlawful state activity. Because "the local law enforcement official is already 'punished' by the exclusion of the evidence in the state criminal
trial," and because "the evidence is also excludable in the federal criminal trial," Justice
Blackmun concluded that the additional deterrence, if any, that might result from suppression failed to "outweigh the societal costs imposed by the exclusion." Id. at 3029, 3032.
It can be argued thatJaniscuts against the normative standard advocated by this Note,
in that it demonstrates the Court's obvious reluctance to extend the exclusionary rule to
improprieties committed by agents of another sovereign. Indeed, since the Court refused
to suppress evidence unconstitutionally seized by state agents, then a fortiori the Court
would not exclude evidence that is merely the product of an illegal search under state law.
Such an analysis, hdwever, -does not represent an accurate reading ofJanis.
InJanis,Justice Blackmun emphasized the civil nature of the tax proceeding, stating at
one point that "[i]n the complex and turbulent history of the [exclusionary] rule, the Court
never has applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or state." Id. at
3029. Moreover, the Court stressed the continued vitality of Elkins as central to its argument that suppression in Janis would result in minimal deterrence because the evidence
was already inadmissible in both state and federal criminal prosecutions, thereby frustrating
"the entire criminal enforcement process, which is the concern and duty of these officers."
Id.
In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that Janis was inconsistent with the reasoning of
Elkins in light of the dual purpose of the federal wagering laws-to raise revenues and "to
'assist the efforts of state and federal authorities to enforce [criminal] penalties.'" Id. at
3035 (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968)). Nevertheless, the majority opinion's emphasis of the good-faith nature of the state police action (id. at 3032), and
its recognition of the "Silver Platter" problem (id. at 3033 n.31), reveal that the Court was
not retreating from the Elkins disapproval of "subterfuge and evasion with respect to
federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation." 364 U.S. at 222.
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C. Arrest and Seizure of Evidence by FederalAgents
The admissibility of evidence obtained by a federal officer
pursuant to a warrantless arrest depends upon the extent to which
Elkins is read as rendering the Di Re rule inapplicable. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed Di Re, apparently without giving much thought to the question. 1 13 As a general
matter, then, state law continues to govern warrantless arrests
made by federal officers. Within this general rule, however, the
federal judiciary has developed a uniform standard to regulate the
narrow issue of the manner in which federal officers enter the
suspect's home. Nonetheless, an analysis of the case law in this area
reveals the uncertainty and inefficiency that result when courts
apply rules based on the artificial distinction between arrest and
search, and lends support to the normative conclusion reached in
this Note that a federal standard should control federal agents.
The story starts with Miller v. United States," 4 decided in 1958,
where the Supreme Court considered the admissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless arrest at the defendant's home." 5 The
Government contended that since there had been probable cause
for the defendant's arrest, the marked currency found in his home
was properly admitted as evidence seized incident to a lawful
6
arrest. 11
The Court held that under Di Re the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest for a federal crime "is to be determined by reference to
state law," in this case "by reference to the law of the District of

In any event, the Court never asked the question that would be crucial to this Note's
analysis: namely, whether a California court would have suppressed the evidence in a civil
proceeding by or against the state. If not, then surely a federal court need not exclude
more. If yes, then considerations of deterrence and federalism might well have suggested a
contrary result inJanis.
This is not to imply that a federal court must suppress in every situation in which a
state court would suppress. A federal court is free in each instance to make an independent determination as to the effect that suppression would have on the state goal of deterrence.
113 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 420-21 n.8 (1976).
114357 U.S. 301 (1958).
" In Miller, federal and District of Columbia agents forcibly entered an apartment in
the District of Columbia. Initially, the officers knocked on the defendants door and identified themselves. The defendant opened the door on its chain and asked the officers to
state their purpose. Before any response was forthcoming, he attempted to close the door;
at that point the officers broke the chain and entered. In the apartment they found
marked currency which formed the basis of the defendant's conviction. The police officers
possessed neither a search nor an arrest warrant. Id. at 303-04.
"

See id. at 304-05.
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Columbia."'

17

Accordingly, the Court found that the defendant

"could not [have been] lawfully arrested in his home by officers
breaking in without first giving him notice of their authority and

purpose."" 8 Since these conditions had not been met, the Court
suppressed the evidence."

9

More important than the substantive holding in Miller was the
theoretical foundation of the Court's decision. One commentator

has pointed out that the Court had four options in choosing the
source of the controlling law. 12" First, the Court could have dealt

with the question of entry as part of the "reasonableness" requirement of the fourth amendment. 12 1 Second, the Court could have
applied the federal statute prescribing the manner of entry to execute a search warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 3 109,122 to the arrest situation,
thereby "creat[ing] a uniform standard applicable to federal arrests
made anywhere in the United States and eliminat[ing] the distinction between the execution of search warrants and the making of
an arrest."'1 23 Third, even if the Court had refused to apply section
3109, Rule 57(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could
have provided a similar basis for a uniform federal standard of
arrest.' 24 In the end the Court chose to apply the fourth alterna1 17

Id. at 305-06.

18

at 313.
Id. at 313-14.
120Blakey, supra note 3, at 519.
119 Id.

2

1 1 Id.

The statute provides in relevant part:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to
liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970).
123 Blakey, supra note 3, at 522. The advantage of this choice is obvious. In addition to
creating a uniform standard, a decision based upon statutory construction "would leave
Congress the opportunity of enacting comprehensive legislation based on further experience." Id. Furthermore, there would be no disruption of state procedure or problem of
retroactivity, as there is in constitutional adjudication. Id.
Although § 3109 by its terms applies only to the execution of search warrants, it would
not have been difficult for the Court to hold warrantless arrests within the statute's purview. In fact, the defendants attorney argued that "it would be 'illogical and unreasonable'
to suppose that Congress had intended a lesser standard to obtain when an entry was
made24without a warrant, albeit to arrest." See id. at 517.
1 Id. at 522. Rule 57(b) states: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the
court may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any
applicable statute." Professor Blakey observes that prior to the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, federal procedure conformed to state standards, but that
Rule 57(b) "was designed to guarantee that such a practice would no longer prevail."
Blakey, supra note 3, at 522. Although it is arguable whether the rule was indeed intended
122
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tive, the rule of Di Re, that the controlling law is that of the place of
arrest.

1 25

Although Miller decided that the validity of a warrantless arrest
is to be determined on the basis of local law, the Court confusingly intermingled its discussion of section 3109 with that of District of Columbia law.12 6 Hence, lower federal courts differed as to
whether Miller truly dictated that a state standard should control, 1 27 and no clear and consistent rule existed to guide law enforcement officials.
In Ker v. California, 28 decided in 1963, the Supreme Court
once again attempted to establish guidelines for police entry into a
home, but this time in the context of state officers' arresting and
searching for state criminal activities. The case is relevant, however, for dicta in Justice Clark's opinion further obscured the question whether section 3109 was to apply to federal officers conducting warrantless arrests.
The actual holding of the Court was that the state conduct in
question did not violate the fourth amendment. 1 29 Unfortunately,
in the course of his opinion Justice Clark gave two conflicting interpretations of Miller. In drawing a valid distinction between constitutional and supervisory suppression, Justice Clark at one point
observed: "[I]nsofar as violation of a federal statute required the
exclusion of evidence in Miller, the case is inapposite for state prosecutions, where admissibility is governed by constitutional stan-

to cover the situation before the Court, there was some support in the treatises for this
view. See id. at 522 n.180. In any event, such a construction would certainly be consistent
policy behind the rule.
with the
25
'
See Blakey, supra note 3, at 523.
26
See 357 U.S. at 306. District of Columbia law is local not federal. The precise hold'
ing in Miller was that the validity of the arrest was to be determined by local law, and that
local law as expressed in Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949), required
an announcement of notice and purpose. The Courts justification in reviewing a purely
local question was that the District of Columbia law was "substantially identical" to 18
U.S.C. § 3109 (1970). Since this statute is not limited to the District of Columbia, the Court
reasoned that by discussing local law the opinion would lay down proper guidelines for all
federal officers who enter homes in the execution of search warrants. 357 U.S. at 306. See
also Blakey, supra note 3, at 524-25.
121 Compare Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 951 (1960), and United States v. Macri, 185 F. Supp. 144, 147-49 (D. Conn. 1960)
(state law controls), with Munoz v. United States, 325 F.2d 23, 26-27 (9th Cir. 1963), and
United States v. Barrow, 212 F. Supp. 837, 844-45 (E.D. Pa. 1962), aff'd, 363 F.2d 62 (3d
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001 (1967) (federal law controls). For a discussion of the
relevant federal and state decisions post-Miller, see Blakey, supra note 3, at 527-36.
128 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
12
Id. at 37-43.
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dards."'130 In Miller, however, it was not the violation of section
3109 that necessitated suppression, but rather the violation of a
local law having standards "substantially identical" to those of section 3109. Moreover, this statement contradicted Justice Clark's
3
earlier statement that Miller was decided according to local law.' '
As one commentator has noted: "The difference is crucial when
' 32
federal arrests occur outside the District of Columbia.'
The utter confusion of the Ker dicta becomes clear when Justice Clark's statements are applied to a Miller-type situation. If federal officers had arrested a defendant in the same manner as the
state agents in Ker, but for a federal crime, the evidence would
have been admissible under Justice Clark's earlier and correct reading of Miller, but inadmissible under his second interpretation.
That is, if state law controlled the manner of arrest, then the federal agents' conduct would be judged under California law, which
permitted such an entry; 3 3 if, however, federal law governed, then
Miller indicated that section 3109 would forbid such an entry. In
short, Ker not only failed to clarify Miller, but actually increased the
confusion by misreading the earlier case.
Just as lower federal courts had differed in their reading of
Miller, Ker also inspired inconsistent interpretations. In Jackson v.
United States,' 34 four Massachusetts policemen and two FBI agents
armed with an arrest warrant entered the defendant's apartment
and discovered a revolver. Without discussing whether the arrest
was state or federal action, the First Circuit, citing Ker, agreed with
the Government's contention that state law controlled on the issue
of arrest.' 35 In Sabbath v. United States,' 3 6 however, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result, holding that the effect of Miller
was to make section 3109 applicable to arrests by federal officers
for federal offenses.' 37 In an attempt to eliminate the confusion,
13 0

Id. at 39.

131 "This Court . . . has long recognized that the lawfulness of arrests

for federal

offenses is to be determined by reference to state law insofar as it is not violative of the
Federal Constitution." Id. at 37. See also Blakey, supra note 3, at 541.
131Blakey, supra note 3, at 541.
133 See 374 U.S. at 37-38; People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6, cert. denied,
352 U.S. 858 (1956).
134 354 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1965).
135
Id. at 981.
136380 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd on other grounds, 391 U'.S. 585 (1968).
37
1 Id. at 111. The court first observed that "[i]t
is not clear just what law sets the
standards which govern an officer's entry into a dwelling for the purpose of making an
arrest." Id. at 110. Although no statute expressly provided the method of entry for federal
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided the Sabbath
case.

1 38

Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, proceeded to demonstrate that right things are often done for the wrong reasons. In
one short paragraph, Justice Marshall misread Miller and, at least
for certain situations, laid down a clear and ascertainable federal
standard to guide federal law enforcement behavior. 139 The result
is that federal officers are now subject to the uniform standard of
section 3109, at least for arrests and searches covered by that section. Absent coverage by section 3109, however, Di Re remains
good law. Hence, the proper resolution of the issue-that a federal
standard ought to govern federal arrests-has achieved only partial
acceptance in the courts.
D. Arrest and Seizure of Evidence by State Officers
This category poses the greatest difficulties. The problem is
that the normative resolution advanced in this Note-that state law
should govern state conduct-conflicts with the proper reading of
Elkins and Di Re together-that federal law shall control. An
analysis of the cases reveals that only a few courts actually recognize this issue, that a large number of courts mechanically cite
either Elkins or Di Re and hold accordingly,"1 and that a sizeable
number are unaware of the legal significance of the distinction
41
between search and arrest.1

The two cases that most intelligently discussed the relationship
between Di Re and Elkins are United States v. Miller 1 42 and United
officers making a warrantless arrest, the court decided that the Supreme Court's intention
in Miller was to have § 3109 apply in this situation.
138 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
139The statute here involved, 18-U.S.C. § 3109, deals with the entry of federal
officers into a dwelling in terms only in regard to the execution of a search warrant. This Court has held, however, that the validity of such an entry of a federal
officer to effect an arrest without a warrant "must be tested by criteria identical
with those embodied in" that statute.... We therefore agree with the parties and
with the court below that we must look to § 3109 as controlling.
Id. at 588-89 (footnotes and citations omitted).
140See, e.g., United States v. Joyner, 492 F.2d 655, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States
v. Day, 455 F.2d 454, 455 (3d.Cir. 1972); United States v. Morris, 445 F.2d 1233, 1235
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971); Hart v. United States, 316 F.2d 916, 919 (5th
Cir. 1963) (all citing Di Re, with no mention of Elkins); United States v. McDowell, 475 F.2d
1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sims, 450 F.2d 261, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1971)
(both citing Elkins, with no discussion of Di Re).
14 See United States v. McDowell, 475 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Sims, 450 F.2d 261, 262-63 (4th Cir. 1971).
142452 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
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States v. Alberty, 143 both decided by Judge Barrett of the Tenth
Circuit. The facts in each case were strikingly similar: local police
were alerted to be on the lookout for a certain car; the officers
located and stopped the car; and the suspect was put under arrest
after the officers noticed a sawed-off shotgun lying on the front
floorboard. 14 4 The court in both cases held that the illegality of the
arrest under state law was irrelevant; federal law controlled. 1 45 In
Alberty, the court analyzed the holding in Elkins and the remand in
Rios v. United States' 4 6 and concluded that these decisions "clearly
vitiated the Court's holding in United States v. Di Re.' 47 Similarly,
in Miller Judge Barrett stated that "[t]he Di Re rule was rejected, by
implication, in Elkins v. United States.' 48 A careful analysis of the
two Supreme Court cases fully supports Judge Barrett's conclusion.' 49 Of course, while Judge Barrett's analysis of the controlling precedents was unimpeachable, his conclusion-that a federal standard should govern state arrests-conflicts with the
normative resolution advocated in this Note.
Other federal courts have managed to reach the same result,
either by ignoring the applicability of Di Re and focusing on Elkins,
or by concentrating on the rationale supporting Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In United States v. Sims 5t and
United States v. McDowell,' 5 ' each court rested its decision solely on
the holding of Elkins-federal law is to control the validity of a
search and seizure in a federal prosecution. 1 52 Moreover, neither
court recognized the distinction between search and arrest which
Di Re and Elkins demonstrated may be crucial. For instance, in
McDowell the basic question was whether the local officer had
143 448
144452
145 452
146364
147 448

F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1971).
F.2d at 732; 448 F.2d at 707.
F.2d at 733; 448 F.2d at 708.
U.S. 253 (1960).
F.2d at 708.

148 452 F.2d at 733. The court pointed out the inconsistency of the two cases by comparing their holdings as follows: "Di Re applied state law governing arrests in the absence
of a controlling federal statute; Elkins held that federal courts must apply federal law, i.e.,
a combination of federal statutes and federal common law, in federal prosecutions." Id.
(emphasis in original).
149In these decisions Judge Barrett recognized that the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Elkins was at substantial odds with that in Di Re, and that a federal standard should therefore control even for state conduct. The Tenth Circuit thus implicitly rejected the notion
that the distinction between arrest (DiRe) and search (Elkins) is a meaningful one. See notes
93-102 and accompanying text supra.
15"450 F.2d 261 (4th Cir. 1971).

151 475 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1973).
1 450 F.2d at 262-63; 475 F.2d at 1039.
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probable cause to arrest the defendant, thereby validating the incidental search which produced the incriminating evidence. After
first correctly citing Elkins as mandating a federal standard for
search and seizure, the court stated that "[w]hether a warrantless
arrest, made by a state or federal officer, is constitutionally valid
depends upon whether, at the moment of arrest, the officers had
probable cause to make it."' 3 Likewise, in Sims the trial judge had
determined that the actions of the West Virginia officers in arresting without a warrant were illegal under state law. 1 54 The court of
appeals, however, cited Elkins and held that federal law controlled; 1 55 Di Re was not considered. Although the choice of federal law may indeed be defensible, neither court provided adequate reasons for its decision.
In Oberg v. United States15 6 the court did not attempt to reconcile Di Re and Elkins; instead it used Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to admit evidence obtained as a result of an
allegedly illegal arrest by state officers: "This being a federal prosecution, there would be no occasion to look to the state law for a
rule of evidence merely because it might be favored in the courts
' 57
of a particular state."'
Only one case clearly confronted the Di Re-Elkins issue before
ruling that state law (DiRe) controlled the validity of the arrest and
thus the admissibility of the evidence obtained. 158 The majority
of cases, contrary to those examined above, have simply applied
59
Di Re without mentioning Elkins.1
Although the Elkins opinion did not cite Di Re, the cases are
1-1 475 F.2d at 1039. Actually, the court's statement was technically correct in that the
constitutional validity of an arrest does depend upon whether probable cause exists, regardless of the arresting officer's jurisdictional affiliation. The error was in equating the question of constitutionality with that of admissibility. This, of course, was the exact issue that
confronted the Court in Di Re. The court in McDowell, however, failed to mention Di Re
and erroneously grouped the two situations (arrest and search) under the single Elkins test.

1'4

See 450 F.2d at 262.

151Id. at 262-63.

15'
353 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1965).
5
- id. at 206. The court first concluded that state law had not been violated by the
local officer's failure to warn the defendant that he did not have to make a statement and
that any statement made could be used against him. The court then concluded that even if
state law had been violated, Rule 26 mandated that the evidence be admissible.
For the use of Rule 26 to-justify the admissibility of evidence obtained as a result of an
allegedly illegal search conducted by local police, see United States v. Melancon, 462 F.2d
82, 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972).
1'58United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740 (9th Cir. July 24, 1975). See notes 160-74
and accompanying
text infra.
"5 9 See cases cited in note 140 supra.
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sufficiently related that no federal court should rest its holding
upon one of the two without distinguishing the other. Yet, often
the same fact pattern will be dealt with by one court under Elkins
and by another under Di Re. Because this confusion destroys the
effectiveness of the suppression sanction and because so many federal courts remain unaware of the problem, the responsibility ultimately rests with the Supreme Court to provide a clear and definitive answer.
V
United States v. Turner6l
In United States v. Turner federal officials applied for and obtained federal authorization to wiretap the phones of suspected
narcotics dealers in California. 6 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
validity of the wiretap order and sustained, with one exception, the
convictions obtained as a result of the surveillance. This exception,
however, represents the crucial aspect of the decision. For by initially reversing the conviction of Clara Bell Hall, 162 the court failed
THE HYPOTHETICAL CASE OF

160

No. 73-2740 (9th Cir. July 24, 1975), reportedin 17 CRIM. L. REX'. (BNA) 2449 (copy

on file at Cornell Law Review). The Ninth Circuit initially decided the case on July 24, 1975.
The case was published as a slip decision and circulated accordingly. On December 31,
1975, however, the court, without explanation, withdrew that portion of its opinion reversing the conviction of Clara Bell Hall and affirmed the lower court decision. Reported in 18
CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2420 (1976). The withdrawn portion of the original opinion thus has
no precedential value, although it demonstrates the confusion that the Di Re rule, unchecked, still generates. It is thus helpful to discuss the withdrawn opinion from this perspective, with the realization that a similar decision might be handed down in the future.
The remainder of the Turner opinion, dealing with the other defendants, was published in
528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975). The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the conviction of
Ms. Hall in a full opinion. United States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976), discussed in
note 162 infra.
161 See United States v. Turner, No. 73-2740, slip op. at 34 (9th Cir. July 24, 1975).
162 On August 31, 1976, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, confirmed the withdrawal
of the original panel decision in Turner by affirming the conviction of Ms. Hall. United
States v. Hall, 543 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1976). The eight member majority rested its decision upon two grounds: first, that Title III governed the arrest and did not incorporate
state standards, and second, that the Di Re rule was inapplicable. Id. at 1232-33. In reaching the former conclusion, the majority relied heavily upon an analysis similar to that set
forth in note 170 infra. With respect to the latter conclusion, the court simply stated that
"[tihe issue in Di Re concerned the quantity of evidence necessary for a warrantless arrest,
not the source or admissibility of that evidence." 543 F.2d at 1233. Because Ms. Hall
merely attacked the source of the evidence leading to probable cause-the wiretap-and did
not assert "that the state agents lacked 'reasonable cause' to detain her as required by
California law," Di Re was of no concern. Id. at 1234. Accordingly, under the authority of
United States v. Keen, 508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975),
evidence obtained in violation of state law was nevertheless admissible in federal court. 543
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to recognize the impact of Elkins upon Di Re and drastically misread Title III, thereby jeopardizing the statute's effectiveness.
As a result of the duly authorized federal wiretap, federal
narcotics agents obtained information about the activities of Ms.
Hall. The agents relayed this information to California narcotics
agents, who began surveillance and subsequently arrested Hall.
The state agents had no warrant for the arrest. In Hall's purse they
discovered the heroin that led to her conviction in federal district
1 63

court.

The Government conceded that the wiretap had not been conducted in accordance with section 631 of the California Penal Code
and that any evidence derived from the tap would have been inadmissible in state court.' 64 Hall therefore contended that under Di
Re the heroin should have been suppressed on the ground that the
arrest, search, and seizure were conducted by state officers in violation of local law. The court agreed, pointing out that because Di Re
65
controlled in the Ninth Circuit, the law of the state must govern.
F.2d at 1235. See note 165 infra.
Two judges concurred in the judgment on the ground that the defendant was not
herself a victim of the wiretap and so lacked standing to question her arrest and search. A
third judge agreed with this view, but joined the majority after this standing argument was
rejected. 543 F.2d at 1235-37, 1246. The three member dissent, written by Judge Koelsch
(who also wrote the relevant part of the original panel decision), argued that Title III incorporated state restrictions on local agents' use of wiretap data (id. at 1237-43), and that Hall,
"[h]aving been charged with possession of the heroin at the time it was seized from her
own purse, . . . clearly had standing to move to suppress it." Id. at 1238 n.4. In addition,
the dissent refused to accept the majority's purported distinction of Di Re. The dissent
stated:
Where a state chooses to prohibit certain conduct by its law enforcement officers
(e.g., the use of information obtained by prohibited means), that prohibition
stands as a limitation on the state officer's power to arrest just as effectively as other
statutory limitations on the arrest power. Indeed, the California courts have indicated that a finding of probable cause to search, seize, or arrest may not be predicated on illegally obtained evidence . . . and I venture that those courts would
declare the instant arrest unlawful because no probable cause existed.
Id. at 1246 (footnote and citation omitted).
Although the majority opinion has the better of the argument over Title III, the dissent's reading of Di Re appears more accurate than the majority's strained interpretation.
The dissent's fatal weakness, however, is that it fails to recognize the inroads made upon
Di Re by Elkins. See id. at 1245 n. 15; notes 93-102 and accompanying text supra. Moreover,
the dissent ignores the fact that the state had no valid interest in suppressing the evidence
at hand.
See notes 172-74 and accompanying textinfra.
"63 See United States v. Turner, slip op. at 34.
14 See id. at 34-35; People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749, appeal
dismissedfor lack of substantialfederal question, 414 U.S. 804 (1973).
165 The court cited a string of Ninth Circuit cases that stood for this proposition,
along with Ker, Miller, and Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 n.5 (1948). United
States v. Turner, No. 73-2740, slip. op. at 36 (9th Cir. July 24, 1975). The court, however,

1977]

SUPERVISORY SUPPRESSION

Although the court recognized that a "few other circuits appear to
have adopted a contrary rule based on the oft-quoted dictum of
167
Elkins,"'6 6 it perceived no inconsistency between the two cases.
Indeed, the opinion declared that even if a federal constitutional
standard were applicable, "an arrest and seizure of evidence by
state officers acting in violation of state law would be violative of
168
the Fourth and Fourteenth amendments."
Turner presents the most troublesome factual situation in
which to formulate a normative standard to accomplish the goal of
deterrence while accommodating differing state and federal interests and encouraging federal and state law enforcement
cooperation. 69 Nevertheless, a standard must be devised to govern
combined federal and state police action without frustrating the
aforementioned goals.'17 Lurking in the background, of course,
failed to mention United States v. McDowell, 475 F.2d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 1973), or Boyle
v. United States, 395 F.2d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1089 (1969), both
of which applied a federal standard to state searches and seizures. Nor did the court meet
the contention raised by the dissent that the case was controlled by United States v. Keen,
508 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 929 (1975) (wiretap evidence obtained
in violation of neither federal constitution nor federal law admissible, despite being obtained in violation of state law). United States v. Turner, slip. op. at 42-43.
In relying on Ker, the court cited exactly that part of Justice Clark's opinion that had
been so confusing in its interpretation of Miller. See id. at 36. In addition, any support in
Ker for the proposition that state law controlled the validity of a warrantless federal arrest
was pure dictum. See notes 128-33 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, Miller and
Johnson were hardly dispositive for they were decided before Elkins.
166 United States v. Turner, slip op. at 36 n.15.
16
Id. The court perceived no inconsistency because the holdings of the two cases are
superficially reconcilable. See notes 93-95 and. accompanying text supra. The court recognized that the Circuits that had failed to follow Di Re had reasoned that Elkins "somehow
'vitiated' the holding of Di Re" (United States v. Turner, slip op. at 37 n. 15), but the court
argued that Ker "strongly suggests otherwise." Id. As previously discussed, the meaning of
Ker is seriously open to question. See notes 128-33 and accompanying text supra.
16' United States v. Turner, slip op. at 36 n.15. This is an incredible statement in view
of the Supreme Court's remands of Elkins and Rios for an independent determination
whether the illegal conduct of the state officials violated the Constitution and therefore
required suppression. See note 79 supra.
169 One commentator has spoken approvingly of the "new system of cooperative
federalism" that the complex of state, local, and federal power has brought about, and has
stressed the importance of such devices as federal training programs for state officers and
the maintenance of comprehensive fingerprint files by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
He concludes that "[t]he net result of these federal activities has been to render wholly
inadequate the traditional concept of rigid separation of federal and state powers in
criminal-law enforcement." Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal
Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REv. 213, 214 (1959). See also Comment, supra note 40, at 502 n.9
(1971).
170 The alternative holding of Turner, relying upon Title III, seriously misinterpreted
the statute, thereby threatening the congressional goal of federal-state cooperation in
wiretapping investigations. Under the logic of Di Re, state law governs an arrest only in the
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are the major problems associated with the "Silver Platter" doctrine
17
and the Supreme Court's futile attempts at characterization. '
The best resolution is that federal courts should admit all evidence constitutionally obtained by state officers, provided the officers have not acted illegally in the process. A federal court should
not invalidate an arrest or search based upon undisputed probable
cause solely because the local officers have received information
from federal agents utilizing investigative techniques unavailable to
absence of an applicable federal statute. In Turner, the court assumed arguendo that Title
III was an applicable federal statute. Nevertheless, the court applied state standards by
reading Title III to incorporate state law. United States v. Turner, slip op. at 34-38.
As a matter.of statutory construction, the alternative holding cannot be justified.
Moreover, the decision would have stymied the use of tactical wiretapping as part of a
comprehensive and cooperative law enforcement effort to counter organized crime. See S.
REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 99, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS
2112, 2188; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 68-79 (1967). In the words of the Turner dissent: "The majority brands as illegal the friendly cooperation between state and federal
officers which is one of the keystones of the Act." United States v. Turner, slip op. at 39.
The court founded its decision on the disclosure and use provisions of Title III. 18
U.S.C. § 2517(1)-(2) (1970). Under these sections, a state law enforcement officer is authorized to receive and utilize wiretap information only to the extent that receipt and use is
appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties. Because the scope of a state
officer's official duty is defined by state, not federal, law and because the use of "unauthorized" wiretap evidence is inappropriate to the proper performance of a California law
enforcement officer's official duties (CAL. PENAL CODE § 631 (West 1970), construed in
People v. Jones, 30 Cal. App. 3d 852, 106 Cal. Rptr. 749, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 804
(1973)), the court ruled that the conviction had been obtained in violation of Title III.
United States v. Turner, slip op. at 37-38.
In drafting Title III, however, Congress did not intend to incorporate state standards.
Instead, § 2517 merely restricts the exchange of wiretap information to proper law enforcement objectives. The thrust of the section is to prohibit personal or commercial espionage use of intercepted communications. Legislative history supports this interpretation:
"Only use that is appropriate to the proper performance of official duties may be made.
The proposed provision envisions use of the contents of intercepted communications, for
example, to establish probable cause for arrest . . ., to establish probable cause to search
.
or..to develop witnesses." S. REP. No. 1097, supra, at 99, reprinted at 2188 (citations
omitted). Thus, since the wiretap had been duly authorized atid implemented, the federal
agents should have been allowed to disclose their information to the state agents and the
state agents then use the information within the confines of an ongoing criminal investigation.
171 See note 9 supra. Turner presents a reverse "Silver Platter" situation. Instead of the
historical problem of federal standards being more restrictive than state standards, here
California law was more restrictive than Title III. And instead of federal officers tainting a
state arrest or search by their participation, here state officers jeopardized the legality of
federal activity. One distinction, however, is crucial. In the typical "Silver Platter" situation,
a federal court would not have admitted the evidence if it had been obtained (hypothetically)
by federal, rather than state, officers. That was the incongruity of the doctrine. In Turner,
however, the state activity was perfectly lawful under federal law, and a federal court would
surely have received the evidence if federal officers had obtained it.
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state agents under state law. 1' This situation differs significantly
from one in which state police themselves act illegally by conducting an unauthorized wiretap. Thus, in Turner the court should
have admitted the heroin as evidence because the state officers
made a perfectly legal arrest, based upon unchallenged probable
cause, which was established through an admittedly valid federal
wiretap.
Analysis of the competing federal and state interests at stake
clearly justifies the adoption of such a standard. The relevant federal interest in Turner was the successful enforcement of federal
narcotics laws. By suppressing the heroin, the Ninth Circuit frustrated this interest. On the other hand, admitting the evidence
would not have abridged any valid state interests. Although
California may well have a legitimate interest in preventing unauthorized wiretapping by state officials, state officers did not wiretap
in Turner. Federal agents did, and California cannot prevent that.
California does not want to deter lawful and effective police work;
it wants to deter unlawful wiretapping. California does not want
people with heroin walking the streets; it wants all people secure
from electronic intrusion. Because of Title III, however, California
cannot absolutely guarantee that protection. Once federal officers
receive information through a tap, the "damage," in a sense, has
already been done, and it serves no legitimate state purpose to
invalidate the subsequent arrest. Had state officers conducted the
wiretapping, the considerations would of course be different, for
then California's interest in protecting the privacy of its citizens
would become relevant. 1'7 3 Thus, a standard focusing upon the legality of the local officers' conduct would accommodate both state
and federal interests and would be clear enough to fulfill the pur1 74
pose of the exclusionary rule.
172

This would be in accordance with the federal-state cooperation envisioned by Title

III. See note 170 supra.
173 Turner smacks of a "false conflict," a choice-of-law term referring to a situation in
which analysis of the policies and interests behind the laws of two states reveals that only
one state has a true interest in having its law applied. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW
PROCESS 91-92 (1965); Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 74 (1967).
174 The rule would satisfy the clarity requirement of the suppression sanction because
local police would still be subject to only one standard-that of their state. On the other
hand, they would know that they were not precluded from acting on the basis of information given to them by federal agents, as long as they themselves were not involved in
activity that violated state law. Furthermore, "Silver Platter" problems would not arise because a federal court would not have to characterize an entire law enforcement operation
as state or federal, but would only have to focus on the conduct of the state agents in order to determine whether they had violated state law in procuring the evidence in question.
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CONCLUSION

The distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Di Re and
Elkins between arrest on the one hand, and search and seizure on
the other, has engendered great confusion among the lower federal courts and law enforcement agents. The Court must announce
new standards to remedy this problem.
There is no doubt that federal standards should control the
conduct of federal agents. The difficult question is what rule
should govern the behavior of state officers. Rule 26 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure supports a purely federal standard, as
does the strong federal interest in successfully apprehending and
prosecuting violators of federal law. On the other hand, notions of
comity and the possibility of deterring state officers from breaking
state law argue for a state standard.
The conclusion that state standards should govern rests on the
judgment that the increased measure of deterrence resulting from
application of state law outweighs the opposing federal interests. In
combined federal-state ventures, however, federal courts must be
careful to suppress evidence obtained by state officers only where
there is identifiable unlawful conduct by the state officers, and only
where suppression will deter such conduct.
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